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This descriptive study is based on a nationwide survey of 
privatization in China. Between 1995 and 2005, close to 
100,000 firms with 11.4 trillion RMB in assets were privatized 
in China. This privatization process encompassed two-thirds of 
state-owned enterprises and state assets. Privatization in China 
has created concentrated private ownership and greatly changed 
corporate governance. After privatization, the state has 
withdrawn from firms’ daily decision making. Soft budget 
constraints have been substantially hardened. Firms have 
become more efficient and more profitable.
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JEL Classification: E37, E43
I. Introduction
Privatizing state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is a major step in 
transforming centralized economies into market economies. By far 
the largest privatization in history has been the privatization of SOEs 
in China. This process started on a large scale in the 1990s. 
Between 1995 and 2005, close to 100,000 firms with 11.4 trillion 
RMB worth of assets were privatized, encompassing two-thirds of 
China’s SOEs and state assets. As a result, the share of the state 
sector in the Chinese economy is now similar to that of some 
Western European economies.
There are some key differences between China’s privatization and 
those of other transitional economies, such as Russia or Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). Unlike Russia or CEE countries where 
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privatization was pushed through via shock therapy, China took a 
gradual approach to its economic reforms and privatization was 
initiated only after several earlier attempts at enterprise reform 
failed. This “delayed” privatization brought about both advantages 
and disadvantages. On the one hand, at the time of privatization, 
most SOEs were losing money and were deep in debt. On the other 
hand, the market and legal institutional conditions for private 
ownership were much more developed than those during mass 
privatization in other transitional economies. It is still unclear which 
of these two initial conditions is more important. Another key feature 
of China’s privatization is that, in contrast to single-mode mass 
privatization, China adopted multiple approaches to privatizing its 
SOEs. These approaches include share issue privatization (SIP), joint 
ventures with foreign firms, and management buy out (MBO), and 
sales to outsiders. 
So far, despite a large literature documenting improved operating 
efficiency from private ownership in general, little is known about the 
effectiveness of China’s privatization, the largest one in history. This 
is an unfortunate omission. China’s privatization is of great 
importance simply due to its sheer size. More importantly, its 
distinct differences from other privatization programs around the 
world can provide valuable insights into privatization designs in 
general.
The main hurdle to studying China’s privatization has been a lack 
of systematic data. This is because except for share issue 
privatization, most privatized firms remain private and there is no 
publicly available data on these private firms.1 To this end, we have 
conducted a nationwide survey of 3065 firms, based on stratified 
random sampling of the population of firms with sales above 5 
million RMB in terms of industry, region, and size. The survey 
includes privatized firms and non-privatized SOEs (including 
collective-owned enterprises (COEs), which enables us to address 
selection issues in performance evaluation. We obtained detailed 
information on changes in corporate governance, corporate finance, 
the relationship between government and firms, and law 
1 Sun and Tong (2003) and Deng, Gan, and He (2008) document that 
Chinese share issue privatization have failed to improve operating efficiency. 
Deng, Gan, and He (2008) point out that expropriation by large shareholders 
created during SIP is the root cause of the failure of share issue privatization 
in China. 
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enforcement, etc. The data from this survey allow us to answer the 
following questions:
1. Has China’s privatization brought about improved operating 
efficiency?
2. If firms perform better after privatization, what are the specific 
mechanisms underlying the improved performance? Specifically, 
3. Has privatization brought about restructuring measures such as 
personnel changes and new business strategies?
Has privatization strengthened incentives and decentralized 
decision making within the firms?
Did privatization change the role of the government? 
Did privatization change corporate governance and allocation of 
control rights?
4. Which mode of privatization, joint venture, SIP, or MBO, is 
more successful?
5. What kind of institutional conditions are necessary for 
successful privatization? 
This paper reports the descriptive statistics of the survey. We show 
that privatization in China has created concentrated private 
ownership and changed corporate governance to a great extent. The 
state has retreated from being involved in the daily operations of 
firms and soft budget constraints have been substantially hardened 
after privatization. Finally, firms are more efficient and more 
profitable after privatization. We note that our results are preliminary 
in nature. Rigorous econometric analysis is offered in a 
contemporaneous paper by Gan, Guo, and Xu (2008).
There is a growing empirical literature that studies various facets 
of China’s privatization (Liu and Liu, 2005; IFC report, 2003). 
However, none of the existing studies are based on nationwide data 
to enable the possibility of getting the full picture of privatization in 
China. Li and Rozelle (2000) study 88 privatized township enterprises 
in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces. Song and Yao (2004) and 
Garnault, Song and Yao (2005) use firm-level data covering 683 
firms in 11 cities from 1995-2001. The study by Liu and Lu (2005) 
is based on survey data collected from 451 firms in five cities and 
four sectors during the 1994-1999. Yusuf et al. (2005) reported on a 
survey of 736 firms from five cities and seven sectors from 1996 to 
2001. All of these papers find that privatization has improved 
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profitability, but the impact of privatization on other performance 
measures is ambiguous. The only work based on nationwide data is 
that by Su and Jefferson (2006). However, they did not have direct 
information about privatization. They inferred that privatization had 
occurred by changes in the legal registration of the firms. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 documents 
China’s earlier SOEs reforms. Section 2 describes the survey. Section 
3 reports descriptive statistics of the survey data and the major 
results of our survey on privatization. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
II. Privatization in China
More than twenty years of reforms in China are marked by the 
government’s piecemeal and gradual approach. The reform of the 
state-owned enterprises is no exception. Instead of outright 
privatization, China concentrated first on productivity improvement 
by initiating enterprise governance structures that stressed 
autonomy and better incentives and then later by adopting long-term 
managerial contracts with pre-specified financial targets (such as 
profits and taxes). Instead of introducing markets and liberalizing 
prices overnight, China first created markets at the margin, parallel 
to the planned economy, by introducing the "dual-track system" in 
the state industrial sector and by lowering bureaucratic barriers to 
entry to the once state-monopolized industries. Admittedly, the 
reforms brought about fundamental improvements in output and 
productivity. The marginal productivity of labor increased by 54 
percent and the growth in total factor productivity (TFP) was 4.68-6 
percent per year during 1980-89 (Li, 1997; Groves, Hong, McMillan, 
and Naughton, 1994).
This gradual reform approach, however, had its limits. When the 
reforms started in 1979, most SOEs were profitable at least on 
paper. Since the reforms began, despite significant output expansion 
and productivity gains, the profitability of the SOEs declined 
substantially and most of them were losing money in the early 
1990s. As a result, many SOEs were deeply in debt and, by 1994, 
close to half of the SOEs had zero or negative equity. The decline in 
profitability was due to two reasons. First, without clear allocation of 
property rights, the SOEs’ obligations were on the profit side but not 
on the loss side, which reduced the SOEs’ incentives to improve 
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their operating efficiencies. Second, SOEs operated under 
unfavorable conditions due to both their many social responsibilities 
(e.g., social security, housing, and education) and external price 
controls imposed by the dual-track system. These policy burdens put 
the SOEs in a disadvantaged position in their competition with the 
rapidly growing private sector. Policy burdens also made it difficult 
for the state to impose hard budget constraints via bankruptcy of 
money-losing enterprises. Meanwhile, the dual-track system created 
enormous opportunities for corruption. In the end, the state acted as 
the residual claimant, absorbing the losses and the consequences of 
the diversion of state assets. This imposed a severe strain on the 
country’s banking system. With SOEs relying on 70-80 percent of all 
bank credit, the banks were saddled with as much as US$200 billion 
in uncollectable debt, which accounted for, by conservative 
estimates, a quarter of all outstanding bank loans (USA Today, Sept. 
8, 1997).
These problems ushered in a new stage of more fundamental 
reforms. In 1993, the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Chinese 
Communist Party Congress endorsed the creation of a modern 
enterprise system. In particular, it approved the development of 
diversified forms of ownership through privatization, which would 
allow SOEs to compete on equal terms in the marketplace. In 1995, 
the central government decided on the policy of “retain the large, 
release the small” (juada fangxiao). That is, the state was to keep the 
largest 300 SOEs in strategic industries and allow smaller firms to 
be leased or sold. The Chinese Communist Party’s 15th Congress 
(1997) gave a green light to privatizing the majority of SOEs 
nationwide. Regional governments were granted de jure ownership of 
SOEs within their jurisdictions and were allowed to sell their assets.
Large scale privatization began in the late 1990s. At this time, 
market and legal institutional conditions for privatization were 
partially in place: both product and labor markets were developed; 
the newly established social security system (esp. unemployment 
benefits) was partially functioning; and new legal institutions and 
new laws were partially in place. These conditions are in sharp 
contrast to privatization programs in other transitional economies. 
Indeed, a common lesson from many former communist countries is 
that they pushed privatization too hard too soon and the lack of 
proper institutional conditions hindered potential efficiency gains 
from privatization.
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In addition to the institutional environment, regional governments 
played an important role in privatization. They often were the 
initiators of privatization. They also acted as a (imperfect) substitute 
for institutions (Pistor and Xu, 2005). Since there was no 
constitutional protection for private property rights until April 2004, 
ad hoc government protection (promises) was crucial to firm 
development. Close relationships with regional governments were 
important for firms to acquire resources like land, credit and energy, 
etc. during privatization. 
There are no official statistics on the number of firms or the value 
of the assets that have been sold off. In our surveyed sample, 62.8% 
of the SOEs and COEs were privatized by the end of 2004. Since our 
sample is carefully constructed to match the population, we infer 
that 92,493 firms had been privatized with total assets of 11.4 
trillion RMB.
III. The Survey 
A. Pilot Surveys
Before we finalized our questionnaire, we conducted pilot surveys 
of 720 firms in four provinces and nine cities, including Beijing, 
Laizhou (Shandong province), Taizhou and Changxing, (Zhejiang 
province), Changchun and Jilin (Jilin Province), Shijiazhuang, 
Pingshan and Tangshan (Hebei province). The pilot surveys were 
conducted through on-site face-to-face interviews and telephone 
interviews. These pilot surveys turned out to be extremely useful in 
helping us to design both our survey questions and procedures. For 
example, for some key (and sensitive) financial variables, instead of 
asking for the information directly, we experimented with using 
multiple choices (in percentage intervals) and found that the 
response rates increased dramatically. 
B. The Sampling Procedure
The survey was conducted in early 2006. We used the population 
of all industrial firms with sales of 5 million RMB or more in 2004 
provided by the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). We started with 
a random sample of 11000 firms stratified by region, industry, size, 
and ownership type. Since we desired to study privatization in great 
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detail, we added 5500 SOEs listed in the 1998 Statistical Bureau 
database, which is a stratified sample based on region, industry, and 
size, to the main survey sample.
Our overall response rate was about 18.6%.2 In our respondent 
sample, we had 900 privatized firms (Sample A), 477 non-privatized 
SOEs and COEs (non-privitized SOEs hereafter), and 1188 firms that 
were never owned by the state (private firms hereafter). This 
combined sample matched the industry and regional distribution of 
the population, but it included a higher percentage of SOEs and 
thus large firms than in the general population. We therefore 
randomly sampled an additional 3200 small- and medium-sized 
non-SOEs from the 2004 population to obtain 500 non-SOE 
respondents (a response rate of about 16%). We used these 500 
small- and medium-sized non-SOEs to randomly replace 500 large 
SOEs to obtain a sample (Sample C) that clearly matches the 
distribution of the general population. The newly surveyed 500 
small- and medium-sized non-SOEs combined with the 1665 
non-privatized SOEs and private firms in Sample A formed Sample 
B.
The survey was mainly conducted through telephone interviews. 
We hired a professional survey company that had a close 
relationship with the National Bureau of Statistics and had 
previously helped NBS to conduct its own surveys. We spent a week 
to train the staff of the survey company to understand each 
question. Throughout the survey, we worked closely with the staff 
and supervised the progress carefully. 
By excluding firms without valid financial information in the NBS 
financial database, Sample A included 808 privatized firms, Sample 
B included 1908 firms (non-privatized SOEs and private firms) and 
Sample C included 535 privatized and 1772 non-privatized SOEs and 
private firms. Table 1 compares the distribution of our survey sample 
(A & B and C) with that of the full population.
IV. Descriptive Statistics of the Survey Data
In this section, we describe what can be learned from the survey data 
based on summary statistics. We focus on corporate governance, 
incentives, corporate finance, and relationships with the government.
2 The response rates between the two samples were very similar. s
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TABLE 1
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION OF OWNERSHIP, SIZE, LOCATION, AND INDUSTRY
This table compares the distribution of our survey samples with that of the 
population by ownership, size, location, and industry. North China includes 
Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei; North-East: Heilongjiang, Jilin, Liaoning; North-West: 
Xinjiang, Qinghai, Ningxia, Gansu, Shaanxi, Innermongolia; Noth-Central: 
Shanxi, Henan, Shandong; South-West: Xizang, Yunan, Guizhou, Sichuan, 
Chongqing; East: Shanghai Jiangsu, Zhejiang; South: Guangxi, Guangdong, 
Fujian, Hainan; South-Central: Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Anhui. 
Sample A & B Sample C Population
Number % Number % Number %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Ownership Distribution
SOEs & COEs 706 26% 556 24% 54,789 20%
Private 956 35% 851 37% 119,538 43%
Joint Venture and Foreign 453 17% 396 17% 57,284 21%
Others 601 22% 504 22% 47,481 17%
Total 2,716 100% 2,307 100% 279,092 100%
Panel B. Size Distribution
Large 159 6% 42 2% 5,580 2%
Medium 792 29% 328 14% 60,182 22%
Small 1,765 65% 1,937 84% 213,330 76%
Total 2,716 100% 2,307 100% 279,092 100%
Panel C. Regional Distribution
North 271 10% 219 10% 22,717 8%
North-East 209 8% 148 6% 18,254 7%
North-West 121 5% 98 4% 10,013 4%
North-Central 435 16% 371 16% 40,724 15%
South-West 162 6% 125 5% 15,242 6%
East 952 35% 821 36% 98,034 35%
South 360 13% 344 15% 51,076 18%
South-Central 206 8% 181 8% 23,032 8%
Total 2,716 100% 2,307 100% 279,092 100%
Panel D. Industry Distribution
Mining 239 9% 206 9% 31,064 11%
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 225 8% 205 9% 23,862 9%
Textiles 330 12% 309 13% 42,852 15%
Timber and Paper 
Products
245 9% 217 9% 24,268 9%
Petroleum & Chemical 450 17% 385 17% 42,799 15%
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A. Privatization Process
By the end of 2005, 62.8% of SOEs had been privatized. 
Consistent with results from the World Bank Survey (Liu and Lu, 
2005), we found that privatization mainly occurred between 2000 
and 2001. Among the 900 privatized firms in our sample, 80% were 
SOEs and 19% were COEs before privatization. Across the different 
layers of governments, regional governments played the most 
important role, initiating 58% of SOE privatization. Another 45% of 
the privatization was initiated by mangers of the firm or jointly with 
regional governments. The roles of the central government and 
employees were negligible. 
MBO was the most important means of privatization, accounting 
for about half of SOE privatization.3 Employee shareholding was 
second, accounting for 25% of SOE privatization.4 The average that 
each MBO manager paid was 7.2 million RMB. Three-quarters of the 
MBO managers paid 100% of their payments by cash and 
one-quarter of the MBO managers paid one-third of the cost in 
down-payments and expected to pay the rest from future profits of 
the firm. Among employee shareholders, each employee on average 
3 We asked about the means of privatization and about managerial 
ownership after privatization. Obviously, due to a controversy about MBOs, 
firms under-report that they are MBOs. Only73 firms or 8.6% of the sample 
categorized themselves as MBOs, inconsistent with the average reported 
managerial ownership of 78% (about half of the firms reported this 
information). Thus, we also use managerial ownership to identify MBOs. If we 
define an MBO as having managerial ownership greater than 50%, 46% of 
the firms in our sample are MBOs. If we define an MBO as managerial 
ownership greater than 20%, 4% of the firms in our sample are MBOs. 
4 Garnaut at el. (2005) point out that privatization after 1997 resulted in 
the concentration of shares in the han of the management. Liu and Lu (2005) 
use the survey data conducted by CASS during 1994-1999 and find that 
MBO is associated with more efficiency gain than is employee share holding. 
Sample A & B Sample C Population
Number % Number % Number %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Metals 598 22% 505 22% 58,530 21%
Machine and Electronics 463 17% 383 17% 46,900 17%
Electricity, Gas and Water  166 6% 97 4% 8,817 3%
Total 2,716 100% 2,307 100% 279,092 100%
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paid 33,417 RMB. The vast majority of employees (96%) bought 
shares with cash. 
Table 2 lists the organizational forms of privatized firms. Privatized 
firms are substantially more likely to be organized as limited liability 
companies and limited joint stock companies (48% and 36%, 
respectively) than are non-privatized firms (37% and 10%, 
respectively). Privatized firms are much less likely to be organized as 
sole-proprietary (geren duzi) enterprises than are non-privatized firms 
(10% vs. 29%).
B. Corporate Governance in Privatized Firms
As in many other countries, privatization in China created 
concentrated ownership. On average, the largest shareholder in our 
sample owned 60% and the second/third largest shareholders owned 
26% of company shares of privatized firms. The largest shareholder 
of non-privatized firms (SOEs and COEs) was the government, which 
owned 94% of the shares, whereas the second/third largest 
shareholders owned 3% of shares. In terms of ownership, the 
privatized firms became similar to private firms.
Privatization is associated with significant personnel changes in 
firms. Over 62% of the firms changed the core members of the 
management team after privatization, whereas only 15% of private 
TABLE 2





Number % Number % Number %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Limited joint stock 
companies
324 36.1% 218 10.1% 12,593 5.0%
Limited liability 
companies 433 48.2% 805 37.2% 169,023 60.0%
partnership 32 3.6% 75 3.5% 14,284 5.1%
Individual-owned 
(geren duzi)
87 9.7% 631 29.1% 26,580 9.5%
Joint ventures 20 2.2% 355 16.4% 27,270 9.8%
Foreign owned 2 0.2% 79 3.7% 29,342 10.5%
Total 898 100.0% 2163 100.0% 279,092 100.0%
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firms made similar changes during the survey period. However, 66% 
of non-privatized SOEs also changed their management team. 
Without more analysis, we cannot say if the personnel changes were 
due to privatization or just a phenomenon among SOEs.
After privatization, three quarters of the firms in the survey 
established boards of directors. Among the non-privatized SOEs, only 
18% of the firms had boards of directors and among private firms, 
44% had boards of directors. In privatized firms, 48% of the 
chairmen of the boards of directors became the largest shareholder 
of their firms. Among private firms, nearly 100% of the board 
chairmen are the largest shareholders and among non-privatized 
SOEs, about 30% of board chairmen are the largest shareholders of 
their firms.
Panels B-F of Table 3 report the allocation of control rights among 
government/party committees, CEOs, corporate boards, and 
shareholder meetings in making key corporate decisions. The 
corporate decisions we asked about included the appointment of top 
managers, employment/layoffs and wages/compensation, corporate 
financial issues, production, and operations. These control rights 
were rated with scores ranging from 0 to 5 in the order of greatest 
importance.
Most strikingly, the government almost completely retreated from 
being involved in the daily operations of companies after 
privatization. On average, government control rights dropped from 
1.9 to 0.4, making privatized firms similar to private firms. The 
control rights of party committees were also substantially weakened, 
dropping from 2 to 1.2, which is in contrast to the score of 2.5 for 
non-privatized firms.
Probably because earlier enterprise reforms had already given 
managers substantial authority over their companies, the control 
rights of CEOs remained largely the same after privatization. 
The importance of both boards of directors and shareholder 
meetings increased substantially after privatization. Their average 
importance increased from 0.1 and 0.06 to 3.2 and 1.74, 
respectively. Interestingly, these figures are similar to those for both 
non-privatized SOEs and privatized firms. These observations, as well 
as our interviews, suggest that there was a trend or pressure to give 
control rights to corporate boards across all firms.
We also asked how firms solved disputes between managers and 
shareholders. Corporate boards were the most important factor in 
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TABLE 3






Panel A. Ownership of Large Shareholders












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel B. Control Rights of Government
Appointment of top 
management
2.5 0.6 3 0
Employment/layoff 2 0.4 2.2 0
Wages/compensations 1.6 0.4 1.9 0
Investment 2 0.4 2.6 0
Fund raising 1.9 0.4 2.4 0
Distribution of profits 1.7 0.4 2 0
Production and marketing 1.5 0.3 1.8 0
Average 1.9 0.4 2.3 0
Panel C. Changes of Control Rights of Party Committee 
Appointment of top 
management
2.6 2.1 2.7 2
Employment/layoff 2.8 2.1 2.8 2.2
Wages/compensations 2.6 2 2.4 2.2
Investment 2.2 1.6 2.5 2
Fund raising 2.1 1.6 2.5 1.7
Distribution of profits 2.5 1.8 2.4 1.8
Production and marketing 2.3 1.7 2.2 1.8
Average 2.4 1.8 2.5 2
Panel D. Control Rights of CEOs
Appointment of top 
management
3.7 3.6 4.1 4.3
Employment/layoff 3.7 3.7 4 4.2
Wages/compensations 3.3 3.4 3.8 4.3
Investment 3.2 3.4 3.8 4
Fund raising 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.2
Distribution of profits 3.8 3.7 4 4.1
Production and marketing 3.6 3.6 3.9 4.2
Average
Panel E. Control Rights of Boards of Directors
Appointment of top 
management
2.9 4.4 4.5 4.5
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resolving disputes between managers and shareholders, with an 
increase from 0.15 to 3.39. The importance of the courts decreased 
from 1.23 to 0.83. Apparently, boards of directors, negotiation, and 
shareholders meetings were much more important in solving 
disputes than were the courts in China during the survey period. 
Privatization strengthened incentives among employees (Table 4). 
The percentage of performance-based bonuses rose from 19% before 
privatization to 29% after privatization, in line with the use of 
bonuses in both non-privatized SOEs and private firms. This 
suggests a trend towards performance-based pay throughout the 
corporate sector in China. 
Privatized firms use both firm-level, group, and personal 
performances in determining bonuses. However, compared with 
non-privatized SOEs and private firms, they appear to rely more on 









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employment/layoff 2.8 4.3 3.9 3.9
Wages/compensations 2.6 3.9 3.9 3.6
Investment 3.2 4.6 4.3 4.5
Fund raising 2.8 4.4 4.3 4.4
Distribution of profits 2.7 4.4 4.4 4.5
Production and marketing 2.3 4 3.9 3.6
Average 2.8 4.3 4.2 4.1
Panel F. Control Rights of Shareholders Meetings
Appointment of top 
management
1.9 3.5 3.4 3.7
Employment/layoff 2 3.4 2.5 3.1
Wages/compensations 1.6 3.2 2.8 2.9
Investment 2.3 4.1 3.7 4
Fund raising 2.5 4.3 3.4 3.9
Distribution of profits 1.5 3.6 3.4 3.8
Production and marketing 1.5 3.2 2.7 2.8
Average 1.9 3.6 3.1 3.5
Panel G. How Disputes between Management and Shareholders Are Solved
Board of directors 0.15 3.39 3.7 4.3
Negotiation 2.8 2.5 2.8 2.8
Shareholders meeting 0.1 1.8 3.1 3.2
Third-party mediation 1.9 1.5 1.6 1.5
Court 1.23 0.83 1 1
Other 1.1 0.35 2.8 2.8
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determining bonuses.
C. Corporate Finance
Table 5 (Panel A) shows that after privatization, firms reinvested a 
greater proportion of their own profits (from 80% to 87%) than they 
did before privatization. The post-privatization reinvestment rate is 
similar to that of non-privatized SOEs and private firms. 
Interestingly, after constitutional property rights protection was 
introduced in 2004 in China, the reinvestment ratio increased in 
2005. 
After privatization, firms relied less on bank loans and their 
loan-to-asset ratios were reduced from 31% to 26%. Most privatized 
firms and private firms reported that the reduction in borrowing was 
due to the lack of demand for bank loans. 
We asked about loan collateral. After privatization, firms relied 
much less on government guarantees (decreased from 8.1% to 1.3%). 
Shareholders or managers were much more likely to provide personal 
guarantees (increased from 10% to 40%). Thus, in terms of the 
sources of loan collateral, privatized firms became similar to other 
private firms, which had virtually no government guarantees and 
were 27% more likely to use managerial or large shareholders’ 
TABLE 4









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Compensation Structure
% of fix salary 84% 71% 75% 66%
% of performance based 
bonus
19% 29% 25% 28%
Panel B. Determinants of Bonuses
Firm’s profits 4.1 4 3.4 3.2
Related department 
performance 1.3 1.6 1.9 2.3
Personal  performance 2.3 2.8 3.6 3.8
Employee’s position 1.7 1.3 1.4 1.5
Others 0.02 0.01 1.7 1.5
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personal guarantees than to use government guarantees. 
It is well-known that before privatization, Chinese SOEs stayed in 
business even if they had untenable financial conditions. The 
soft-budget constraint is an important reason for why the firms had 
little incentive to improve their efficiency. In our sample, about 18% 
of the firms experienced financial distress before privatization and 
3% of the firms experienced financial distress after privatization. 
Before privatization, in 27% of the distress cases, the firms gained 
direct help from the government; more than half obtained bank loans 
(56%) or loans from other, presumably state-owned, firms (57%). As 
a result, only 17% were reorganized before privatization despite their 
financial distress. After privatization, the government, banks, and 
other SOEs provided help in only 19%, 31%, and 19% of the cases, 
respectively, and 29% of the firms in financial distress were 
reorganized. 
TABLE 5









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A Reinvestment and Corporate Finance of 
Privatized Firms
%  reinvest 80% 87% 88% 87%
% banks loans 31% 26% 29% 30%
Panel B Loan Collateral 
Government 
guarantees 
0.081 0.013 0.096 0.002
Shareholders/manager
s own assets
0.095 0.4 0.1 0.27
Panel C What Financial Support Do Firms Get When They Are in Financial 
Distress
%of financial distress 18.0% 3.0% 14.5% 5.3%
Government 27.3% 18.8% 23.2% 5.5%
Banks 55.9% 31.3% 49.2% 63.3%
Investors 18.6% 6.3% 4.3% 45.6%
Other firms 57.1% 18.8% 47.8% 42.2%
Reorganization 17.4% 29.4% 1.1% 4.3%
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TABLE 6












(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A. Importance of Relationship with Government, Favorable Policy and 
Law Enforcement (0-5)
Overall importance of the 
relationship 3.7 3.2 3.9 3
Importance of favorable 
government policy
3.3 3 3.4 3.3
Importance of law enforcement 2.7 2.7 2.9 2.6
Panel B. % Firms Reporting Acquiring Land from Each Channel
Directly acquired land from 
government
100% 59% 99% 97%
Acquired land through government 
connection at lower market prices 41% 95% 93% 95%
Acquired land from government at 
market prices
34% 98% 96% 95%
Panel C % of Land Acquired from Each Channel
Directly acquired land from 
government 39% 26% 52% 1%
Acquired land through government 
connection at lower market prices
53% 35% 11% 27%
Acquired land from government at 
market prices
4% 4% 13% 27%
Panel D. Government's Perceived Incentive to Provide Support
Fiscal revenue 3.8 3.9 4 4
Government officials’ performance 
(political incentives) 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7
Comply with central government’s 
policy
3.2 3.1 2.9 3.1
Improving regional social welfare 2.5 2.7 2.4 2.8
Gaining leverages to use firms to 
serve for the government
2.1 1.5 1.8 1.2
Officials’ direct personal benefits 
(corruption) 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
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D. Relationships with the Government
The state-led development in China means that there are close 
relationships between regional governments and firms. Although the 
governments withdrew from corporate governance after privatization, 
their relationships with the firms was not weakened. After they were 
privatized, 57% of the firms reported no changes in their 
relationships with governments, 23% reported closer relationships 
with governments, and 20% reported more distant relationships with 
governments. All the firms, no matter if they were privatized, 
reported that their relationships with governments and favorable 
government policies are important for firms’ development. 
Land is a major constraint for most firms’ development and 
regional governments play an important role in land allocation. After 
privatization, the percentage of firms that acquired land from direct 
allocation by the government decreased from 100% to 59%, whereas 
99% of non-privatized firms still enjoyed direct allocation of land. 
The proportion of land obtained through direct government allocation 
decreased from 39% to 25% after privatization, whereas about half of 
the land for non-privatized SOEs is still directly allocated. Ninety-five 
percent of privatized firms were able to acquire land below the 
market price through government connections. This percentage that 
is similar to that for private firms and non-privatized SOEs. However, 
the proportion of land acquired at below the market price was 35% 
for privatized and 27% for private firms. It seems that privatized 
firms rarely purchased land at the market price. Market-priced land 
accounted for only 4% of their total land stock, but it was 27% of 
the total land stock for private firms. Overall, after privatization, 
firms received less help from the government in acquiring land, but 
they were still treated more favorably than private firms in 
government allocation of land. Non-privatized SOEs enjoyed the 
largest government subsidy in acquiring land. 
Relationships with the government may come at a cost. That is, 
firms may need to spend time and money due to corruption or rent 
seeking behaviors of government officials. Reflecting the weakened 
relationships with the government after privatization, the number of 
firms that spent over 1% of their total budgets on extra legal 
payments to the government was reduced from 58% to 48%. Firms 
reporting that their managers spent 5% of their working hours 
dealing with the government, e.g., for registration, taxes, and 
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environmental issues, dropped from 29% to 21%, which was still 
higher than for non-privatized SOEs and private firms (18% and 
14%, respectively).
In terms of government incentives for providing support, there 
were not any noticeable difference between privatized firms and other 
firms. Firms believe that fiscal revenue, government officials’ own 
promotion (political incentives), and complying with the central 
government’s policies are the main incentives (all with scores over 3). 
Improving social welfare and gaining leverage to use the firms to 
serve the government are of some importance (scoring around 2). 
Interestingly, the firms do not consider government officials’ personal 
benefit (corruption) as important (with a score of 0.5). 
E. Post-Privatization Performance 
Contrary to earlier studies documenting the failure of Chinese 
share issue privatization in enhancing operating efficiency (e.g., Sun 
and Tong, 2003 and Deng, Gan, and He, 2008), other means of 
privatization have brought about substantial improvement in firm 
performance, both in terms of output expansion and operating 
efficiency. Average sales increased by 44%, from 156 million RMB to 
225 million RMB. Firm assets increased by 12%, from 305 million 
RMB to 342 million RMB. Average profits increased by 138%, from 
5.06 million RMB to 12 million RMB. Financial performance also 
improved substantially. Return on assets (ROA) increased four-folded 
from 1% to 4%. Better financial performance appeared to be driven 
TABLE 7









(1) (2) (3) (4)
Product sales (Mil) 155.5 224.6 136.5 48.2 
Total assets (Mil) 304.5 342.0 244.1 45.1 
Real value added (Mil) 55.9 66.3 13.5 
Profits 5.1 12.0 4.6 2.1 
ROA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Capital Productivity 2.9 3.7 4.7 6.2 
Labor Productivity (000) 118.0 187.5 92.3 287.5 
A NATIONWIDE SURVEY OF PRIVATIZED FIRMS IN CHINA 19
by productivity gains: capital productivity increased by 27% from 2.9 
to 3.7, whereas labor productivity (by output) increased by 59%, 
from 118,000 RMB/person to 188,000 RMB/person. 
While privatized firms performed much better than non-privatized 
SOEs, they still seem to lag behind private firms, both in terms of 
financial returns and productivity. Private firms out-performed the 
other firms by around 50% in all these measures: their ROA was 
6.4%, their capital productivity was 6.24, and their labor productivity 
was 278. 
Clearly these results are highly contemporary, since they do not 
control for firm level heterogeneity and self selection of privatization. 
We consider these issues in a contemporaneous paper (Gan, Guo, 
and Xu, 2008). Below is a very brief summary of some of the results 
in that paper. 
We start with the panel dataset from 1998 (the first year of NSB 
data) to 2005 containing both privatized and non-privatized firms 
(Sample A and B). We control for size, leverage, and industry and 
year dummies in all our regressions. We find that the privatization is 
associated with significantly increases in operating performance, as 
measured as return on assets, return on sales, and profit per 
employee. Moreover, the performance increase is driven by those 
firms that were sold to private owners. 
Since privatization decision may not be random, to mitigate the 
concern of selection, we further include firm fixed effects in our 
regression. Thus any time-invariant firm characteristics (such as 
local economic environment and relationship with the government) 
that may be related to the decision to privatize are fully controlled 
for. The main results are unchanged, suggesting that better firms 
being selected for privatization cannot explain these results.
V. Concluding Remarks
The Chinese privatization scheme is not based on a rational 
design. Instead, it is a result of political games given existing 
institutions. Privatization in China has created concentrated private 
ownership and has greatly changed corporate governance. The 
control rights of privatized firms have been redistributed. The state 
has retreated from being involved in the daily operations of 
companies; large shareholders essentially control major decision 
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making in their firms. After privatization, soft budget constraints 
were substantially hardened. Although the government has 
withdrawn from daily corporate decision making, its policy support is 
still considered important by firms. After privatization, firms became 
more efficient and more profitable based on various measures, 
including product output, profitability, and productivity. Our data 
allow us to identify specific mechanisms of improved post- 
privatization performance, which we consider in a contemporaneous 
paper (Gan, Guo, and Xu, 2008).
Some implications can be drawn from China’s privatization 
experience. The Chinese experience suggests that postponing 
privatization to accumulate political support for privatization and to 
establish institutional conditions increases the effectiveness of 
privatization. In particular, privatized firms operate better when the 
product and labor markets are functioning. Better developed 
financial institutions help privatized firms to trade on their property 
rights and to obtain external financing. Social safety nets help firms 
deal with inevitable layoffs during the privatization. Legal institutions 
protect the property rights of the owners of privatized firms and 
provide them with incentives to grow their firms (Johnson, McMillan, 
and Woodruff, 2002).
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